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Using high-frequency data from the European Climate Exchange (ECX), we examine the determinants of price 
impact of €21 billion worth of block trades during 2008-2011 in the European carbon market. We find that 
wider bid-ask spreads and volatility are characterised by smaller price impact. Larger levels of price impact are 
more likely to occur during the middle of the trading day, specifically the four-hour period between 11am and 
3pm, than during the first or final hours. Purchase block trades induce relatively smaller price impact on price 
run-up, while sell block trades exhibit larger price impact on price run-up. We conclude that block trades on the 
ECX induce less price impact than in equity or conventional futures markets, and that a significant proportion of 
the effects contradict findings on block trades in those markets; thus, we provide the first evidence of the curious 
bent to block trading in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). 
 
Keywords: Carbon futures; Block trades; Price impact; High-frequency trades; European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU-ETS); Determinants; Liquidity. 
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1. Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement aimed at curbing global greenhouse gas 
emissions, came into force on 16 February, 2005. Using 1990 emission levels as a threshold, 
it requires a combined reduction of 5.20% in greenhouse gas emissions by industrialised 
countries. About 141 countries, accounting for more than 55% of global greenhouse gas 
emissions, ratified the treaty by 2004. The greenhouse gas permit trading market has since 
grown into a multi-billion dollar market, with Europe at the forefront. The European 
emissions permit market, through the EU’s main climate change policy instrument, the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), has accounted for more than 80% of global market 
share in each year since 2006. In 2010, the value of total EU Allowances (EUAs) – carbon 
credits – traded climbed to US$ 119.8 billion (more than 84% of the global carbon market 
value), and the EU-ETS-driven share of the global carbon market increased to 97% (Linacre, 
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Kossoy, and Ambrosi 2011). Futures account for more than 70% of the Euro value of trades, 
with trades executed either OTC or on organised exchanges. The European Climate 
Exchange (ECX) in London is the largest of the exchanges in the scheme and in the world, 
with more than 90% of EU-ETS exchange-based trading share. 
Since the EU-ETS was established for the purpose of reducing emissions in industrial 
installations, a significant proportion of trades on the platforms are institutional (most 
institutional trades are executed as blocks). Municipal and state government-led initiatives are 
already established in other countries, such as China, Canada, Japan and the United States. 
Finally, the Conference of Parties held in Durban in December 2011 reached an agreement to 
negotiate a successor to the Kyoto Protocol by 2014. This raises the strongest prospect yet of 
global compulsory emissions trading. The EU-ETS will be the logical anchor for a global 
scheme. Our study therefore contributes to both global climate change policy formulation and 
the finance literature on block trading. 
This study is motivated by the fundamental necessity to understand the impact of the 
increasingly large number of block trades in the EU-ETS exchange-based futures trading. In 
2005, approximately 80% of EU-ETS derivatives trades occurred OTC; most of these trades 
meet the ECX’s definition of block trades. The volume traded OTC progressively decreased 
to average approximately 70% of the total transaction value over the entire course of Phase I, 
the trial period (2005-2007). By January 2010 (during Phase II, the Kyoto commitment 
period: 2008-2012), the proportion of exchange-based trades in the scheme had reached 50%, 
according to World Bank estimates (see Kossoy and Ambrosi 2010). This development is 
driven by the need of participants to avoid counterparty risks, an issue that has taken on 
greater significance in derivatives markets as a whole.  
The price impact of block trades has been extensively researched for equity markets, 
and recently for futures markets (see Chou et al. 2011). Kraus and Stoll (1972) were the first 
to demonstrate the price impact of block trades. They present several arguments as to the 
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cause of this phenomenon: short-run liquidity effects occurring as a result of price 
compromise suffered because counterparties are not readily available; price compromise 
when instruments are not perfect substitutes for each other, leading to inefficient trading and 
hence price impact; and the idea that price concessions granted in order to execute market 
order underscores desperation to execute the market order. These factors convey information 
to markets about the potential value of the order to the counterparties, and hence the order 
becomes information driving, leading to price impact. Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers 
(1990) find evidence of premium payment or price concession in the execution of buyer-
initiated block trades. They hold that buyers pay a premium prior to a block trade; the 
premium is consequently incorporated permanently into the price, while no evidence of 
premium payment is found for block sales. Kraus and Stoll (1972) find that price impact is 
higher for block purchases than sales, because a concession or implicit commission is usually 
higher for purchases than sales, suggesting that there is indeed a premium paid on block sales. 
A major contribution of their pioneering work is the establishment of a positive relationship 
between block trades and price impact. Chan and Lakonishok (1993), among others (see for 
example Barclay and Warner 1993, Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers 1990), provide 
supporting evidence for this; they also find a relationship between market capitalisation and 
price impact (see also Chan and Lakonishok 1995).   
Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987) also investigate price impact due to block 
trades, and discover that larger trades induce larger price impact than smaller trades. Barclay 
and Warner (1993), Chakravarty (2001) and Alzahrani, Gregoriou, and Hudson (2013) also 
provide evidence that order size and subsequent execution potentially result in corresponding 
trade price impact. In relation to temporary price impact, the first study to show asymmetry in 
block trades’ price effects is Gemmill’s (1996) on the London Stock Exchange, with 
significant differences in the magnitude of price impact being reported. Gemmill (1996) 
reports permanent price impact due to block trades on the London Stock Exchange, and a 
4 
 
permanent impact equivalent to 33% of the bid-ask spread for block trades that are purchased, 
and 17% for block trades that are sold.  
Consistent with Gemmill (1996), most of the studies conducted on the price impact of 
buyer- and seller-initiated block trades report price impact asymmetry between the two 
groups (see among others Conrad, Johnson, and Wahal 2001, Keim and Madhavan 1996, 
Chiyachantana et al. 2004, Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers 1990, Chou et al. 2011). They 
generally submit that prices appreciate after purchase block trades are executed, and 
depreciate on their sale. The depreciation that occurs after sell trades are executed suffers 
reversion, but purchase block trade induced appreciation remains. Chan and Lakonishok 
(1993) argue that the reason for this is that block sales have a higher likelihood of involving a 
broker (acting as an intermediary) than block purchases. The temporary impact from sell 
trades is therefore a reflection of price concession as compensation for the role played by the 
broker. Liquidity thus plays a key role in the existence of price impact asymmetry between 
block purchases and sales (see also Gregoriou 2008).  
However, despite the large body of literature on price impact of block trades in the 
conventional markets, to our knowledge, no study has been undertaken for block trade price 
impact in permit markets. We therefore attempt an analysis of determinants of price impact in 
the EU-ETS using tick data from the scheme’s largest platform, the ECX, in order to 
understand the impact of block trades in this important market. Our results show intriguing 
patterns that are largely inconsistent with earlier studies from traditional markets. For 
permanent and temporary effects, we find several instances of price impact asymmetry for 
block purchases and sales. Contrary to previous literature on equity markets, wider spreads 
lead to smaller price impact. We attribute our findings to the fact that block trades executed 
after a price run-up induce smaller price impact, as suggested by Saar (2001). The implication 
is that liquidity concerns in the EU-ETS play a less prominent role in emissions permits 
pricing than in customary markets. This is supported by Ibikunle, Gregoriou, and Pandit 
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(2013), who find that small amounts of trading lead to larger proportions of price discovery in 
the EU-ETS. Short-run improvements in liquidity, though an important factor in market 
efficiency (see Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 2008), do not detract from block trade 
price impact on the world’s largest carbon platform. Our findings have implications for 
compliance traders and policy makers alike. It is important that in designing future phases of 
the EU-ETS, this and other aspects of our results are considered. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide a 
discussion of the EU-ETS mechanism and the setup of the ECX, and review related literature 
based on permit trading. Section 3 outlines the data and econometric methodology used. 
Section 4 discusses the empirical analysis, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background of Study 
2.1. Institutional Set-up 
The EU-ETS currently covers about 12,000 installations within the European Union (EU), 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland. The initial aim was to fulfil the EU’s obligation under the 
Kyoto Protocol. Although the terminal year for the Protocol is 2012, the EU has already 
extended the scheme into a third phase since the start of 2013. Since its inception in 2005, the 
scheme has steadily improved in terms of market structure and functioning. The scheme runs 
as a classic cap and trade, with emission permits initially 100% grandfathered in 2005. 
Subsequently, certain percentages have been allocated for sector-dependent auctioning. In the 
EU-ETS, the emission permit is known as the European Union Allowance (EUA). EUAs are 
electronically generated records on the national registries of individual participating countries. 
The national registries are all connected to a common central location called the Community 
Independent Transaction Log (CITL). Every April, the installations submit EUAs equivalent 
to their verified emissions for the preceding year. Project-based permits can also be submitted; 
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with certain restrictions
1
 (see Daskalakis, Ibikunle, and Diaz-Rainey 2011 for a financial 
perspective of the EU-ETS).  
We are not aware of any study on the price impact of block trading in the EU-ETS; 
however, Mizrach and Otsubo (2014), in a general microstructure analysis of the EU-ETS, 
examine the price impact of regular EUA and CER trades. No distinctions are made for the 
trades based on size or trade sign. They also do not distinguish between upstairs and 
downstairs markets trades, which we separate in this study. Benz and Klar (2008), Frino, 
Kruk, and Lepone (2010) and Ibikunle, Gregoriou, and Pandit (2012) examine liquidity, price 
discovery and transaction costs in the EU-ETS. Their results are not directly relevant to this 
study, but do provide an insight into vital microstructure properties of the EU-ETS. Some 
other studies have examined off-platform variables that can explain price formation in the 
EU-ETS: Christiansen and Arvanitakis (2005), Mansanet-Bataller, Pardo, and Valor (2007) 
and (2008), all using daily data, investigate the effects of energy fundamentals on daily EUA 
returns during Phase I of the EU-ETS. Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007) and Miclăuş et al. 
(2008) employ event study methodology in investigating the effect of NAP and emissions 
verification announcements on EUA prices. Ibikunle et al. (2012) provide the longest time-
horizon study of the EU-ETS to date; they argue that the ECX has experienced accelerated 
improvement in market efficiency and liquidity over the 2008-2011 period, the first four 
years of the Kyoto commitment phase. This view is also held by Kalaitzoglou and Maher 
Ibrahim (2013) and Ibikunle, Gregoriou, and Pandit (2013), whose analyses show evidence of 
improving market maturity and trading sophistication. 
 
2.2. The European Climate Exchange (ECX) and Trading Rules 
The ECX, a member of the Climate Exchange Plc. group of companies, is the largest carbon 
exchange in the world by volume and value. Trading rules and procedures on the exchange 
follow general financial markets practice. Trading commences at 07:00:00 and lasts until 
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17:00:00 UK local time. There is a pre-trading period of 15 minutes from 06:45:00 to allow 
members to place orders in preparation for the start of trading; however, almost no orders are 
executed during this period. The settlement period, which runs from 16:50:00 to 16:59:59 UK 
time, is the third stage of the trading day and is used to determine the settlement price. The 
fourth stage of trading is the after-hours period, reserved only for reporting Exchange for 
Physical/Swaps (EFP/EFS) trades. Ibikunle, Gregoriou, and Pandit (2013) have analysed the 
contribution of trades reported during this period to price discovery. These trades can be 
regarded as a form of upstairs trading in the context of the ECX, and hence will not be 
examined in this paper. 
Trading occurs both directly on the platform and bilaterally off it, before being 
submitted to the exchange for on-screen registration. By virtue of this, the exchange 
maintains three trading mechanisms: trades occur on the ICE platform; by EFP/EFS trades; or 
through the Block Trade Mechanism. Participants submit orders by being entered into the 
ETS. The trades executed as a consequence of orders are deemed to be anonymous according 
to exchange rules. The executed trades go via the trade registration system (TRS) for account 
allocation. Price transparency is ensured by the availability of real-time prices made available 
on ICE Platform screens and vendor sources. These vendors include Bloomberg, CQG, E-
Signal/FutureSource and Reuters. The exchange also sets reasonability limits for purchase 
and sale orders. A purchase (sale) order above (below) the limit is rejected. A sale (purchase) 
order above (below) the limit is accepted without being executed, but the market shifts to 
alter the reasonability limits, hence placing it within the limit. The exchange also maintains a 
‘no cancellation range’, within which trades reported as mistakes may not be cancelled. This 
rule enhances market confidence and reduces noise trades. Clearing is provided by Ice Clear 
Europe, which charges transaction fees (in addition to annual subscription fees for various 
participant categories) on behalf of the exchange. Transaction fees are not placed on the 
exercise of an option or on physical delivery of futures contracts. The minimum tick has been 
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held constant at €0.01 per tonne of CO2 since 27 March, 2007, from its previous rate of €0.05 
at commencement in 2005. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
We obtain two sets of data; the first is high-frequency data from ICE Futures Europe, 
detailing intraday transactions to the nearest second. The dataset covers the start of Phase II 
of the EU-ETS (1 January, 2008) to 9 May, 2011. The use of the dataset ensures that this 
study provides the longest time period analysis of EU-ETS Phase II trading to date. The 
second dataset contains end of day (EOD) variables; it is also from ICE Futures Europe, and 
covers the same time span and provides daily aggregates of our intraday data, among other 
daily variables. We select only December expiry contracts because they are the only ones for 
which official exchange index data are available; this is perhaps because a sufficient level of 
trading only occurs in December maturity contracts. The selected December maturity 
contracts are for 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. This phenomenon in the EU-ETS is 
well reported, and researchers have focused mainly on December maturity contracts (see for 
example Kalaitzoglou and Maher Ibrahim 2013, Ibikunle et al. 2012 among others). All 
trades executed within the initial pre-open period and during the after-hours market are 
excluded. All other trades executed off-market and in the upstairs market, which includes 
mainly EFP/EFS trades, are also excluded. These steps and our chosen methodology are 
adopted to provide a basis for comparing our results with previous studies. Finally, we 
exclude the December trades for contracts approaching maturity given the observation of 
extreme levels of volatility relative to other months, which might bias our estimates. Thus, 
for a futures contract with December 2010 maturity, the last trade included in the final sample 
will be its last trade in November 2010. The final dataset consists of a total of 961,131 trades 
over the period. We follow the ECX’s definition of a block trade as any trade with a 
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minimum lot size of 50 contracts (50,000 EUAs). This definition yields a sample size of 
16,715 block trades (excluding EFP/EFS trades). This is about 1.74% of the total number of 
trades in the cleaned dataset. The absolute quantity is comparable to the 16,951 NYSE 
downstairs block trades analysed by Madhavan and Cheng (1997) for 30 Dow Jones stocks, 
and larger than the sample of 5,987 from the London Stock Exchange investigated by 
Gemmill (1996). We adopt the trade signs allocated to each trade by the ECX in our data set.
2
 
 
3.2. Methodology 
We begin our inquiry by computing three types of price impact generally recognised in the 
literature. These are the temporary, permanent and total price impact measures. The 
microstructure literature acknowledges permanent price impacts as those induced by private 
information, and temporary price impacts as those resulting from noise or liquidity-induced 
trading, leading to reversal of price (see Glosten and Harris 1988, Chan and Lakonishok 1995, 
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara 2002).  
Usually, block trades demand more liquidity than is likely to be available at current 
quoted prices. Thus, if a block trade is to be fully executed against the available level of 
liquidity, it must ‘walk’ through the order book, and as a result ends up forcing instrument 
prices to shift in the trade direction; i.e. down for sells and up for buys. The temporary impact 
on price measures the market’s frictional price reaction to the execution of a block trade, 
which also dissipates thereafter, hence the definition represented in Equation (1) below. 
Specifically, Equation (1) quantifies the liquidity element of price impact since the block 
trade will be executed at a price different from the equilibrium price as dictated by current 
quotes. This friction in pricing occurs because of the absence of readily available willing 
counterparties that can take the opposite side of the block trade at the best available 
corresponding quote. The temporary effect can thus be viewed as compensation to the 
counterparties providing the liquidity required for block trade execution. The compensation is 
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offered by block purchasers (sellers) as a price premium (discount) in order to entice 
counterparties into trading with them. 
The permanent impact encapsulates the enduring impact of the block trade on an 
instrument, i.e. the price shift that is not reversed following the block trade. Thus, the 
permanent impact measures the information component of a block trade, since the previous 
price equilibrium is not reverted to. This implies that the market has learnt something new 
about the instrument, which leads to a new price equilibrium. In this study, we follow 
Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1990), Gemmill (1996), Frino, Jarnecic, and Lepone 
(2007) and Alzahrani, Gregoriou, and Hudson (2013) in using the five-trade benchmark to 
compute the price impact measures; the equations used are also based on these papers. Thus, 
for temporary impact (Equation 1), we measure the percentage of price reversal after five 
trades following the block trade; and for permanent price impact, Equation (2) considers the 
percentage change in price from five trades prior to the block trade to five trades after the 
block trade. The third price impact measure, total impact, captures the entire percentage price 
impact, which includes both the liquidity and the information component. Since we project 
(in line with previous studies stated above), that the liquidity effect dissipates only after about 
five trades, Equation (3) should capture both the temporary and permanent price effects of the 
block trade. We ensure comparability by calculating all three measures as percentage returns 
according to Equations (1), (2) and (3): 
5( )Temporary Impact tt
t
P P
P
                                                                                                       (1)
5 5
5
( )
Permanent Impact t t
t
P P
P
 


                                                                                                      (2) 
5
5
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Total Impact t t
t
P P
P



                                                                                                                 (3) 
We use transaction prices in the absence of direct quotes.
3
 We adopt the model of Frino, 
Jarnecic, and Lepone (2007), thereafter employed by Alzahrani, Gregoriou, and Hudson 
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(2013), in examining some likely determinants of block trade price impact on the ECX. 
Accordingly, we estimate the following time series regression with EUA contracts-specific 
variables: 
                      
t
i
i
i
i
i
itxt MDDDTDPI  
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4
4
1
3
9
1
20                                       (4)
 
 
where PIt corresponds to one of three price impact measures: total price impact, permanent 
price impact and temporary price impact. The explanatory variables are computed as follows. 
Xt is a vector of six explanatory variables (Size, Volatility, Turnover, Marketreturn, 
Momentum and BAS) defined below. TDi, DDi and MDi are dummy variables for time (hour) 
of day, day of week and month of year and are further defined below. 
Size represents the natural logarithm of volume of contracts contained in the block 
transaction.
4
 Based on the assumption that trade size corresponds to information content (see 
Kraus and Stoll 1972, Easley and O'Hara 1987, Chan and Lakonishok 1993 among others), 
we adopt trade size as a proxy for information content of the block trade. When investors 
have private information about an instrument, they act based on the new belief developed as a 
result of the new information. Hence, they place a sell order if the belief is that the instrument 
is overpriced, or purchase if the instrument is under-priced (see also Madhavan, Richardson, 
and Roomans 1997). Volatility represents the standard deviation of trade execution price 
returns for the trading day up until the block trade.
5
 This measure is in line with previous 
studies (see for example Frino, Jarnecic, and Lepone 2007). Volatility is representative of 
intraday fluctuation in trading prices; it shows the pattern of trading belief over the course of 
a trading session, and can therefore be regarded as an implicit proxy of adverse selection 
costs of trading. The higher the level of volatility of an instrument, the greater the risk 
associated with it, thus leading to wider spreads as compensation for trading (see Sarr and 
Lybek 2002). The onset of larger spreads on account of volatility suggests that volatility will 
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lead to price impact. It is expected that volatility of the futures contracts will be positively 
related to price impact (Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan 2001). 
Turnover represents the natural logarithm of the aggregate Euro value of all futures 
contracts traded on the trading day prior to the execution of the block trade, divided by the 
prevailing Euro volume of open interest. Turnover has been regularly employed as a measure 
of trading activity and market liquidity (see among others Lakonishok and Lev 1987, Hu 
1997, Frino, Jarnecic, and Lepone 2007). Further, open interest has been established as a 
component of market liquidity measures in futures markets. Using open interest as a 
component of the proxy for market depth (liquidity) follows Bessembinder and Seguin (1992) 
and Fung and Patterson (1999). Open interest is a reflection of the order flow of trades and 
the readiness of traders to risk their funds, and therefore has similar levels of correlation with 
volatility that spreads have. Price impact is expected to be lower with improvements in 
liquidity; hence, we anticipate a negative relationship with price impact.
6
 Momentum is 
computed as the lagged cumulative daily return for each contract over five trading days 
before the trading day of the block trade. This expresses the trading trend for the specific 
instrument. Higher returns will indicate a purchasing trend, and lower returns, a selling trend. 
Saar (2001) argues that the price performance history of an instrument is related to its 
expected price impact asymmetry. Specifically, block trades that are executed on the back of 
decreasing price performance will manifest higher positive asymmetry, and block trades 
executed after a strong run of price appreciation should exhibit less impact, or possibly 
negative asymmetry. Since the transition to Phase II in the EU-ETS, the market has 
experienced stronger liquidity and market efficiency, and hence has largely been on a run-up 
in terms of price performance. Based on this, we anticipate momentum will have 
predominantly negative price impact coefficients. 
BAS is a second measure of liquidity in the model. Relative bid-ask spread is the 
prevailing relative bid-ask spread when the block transaction is executed. We expect that 
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when spreads are wide, there would be higher price impact than when they are narrow. We 
compute relative bid-ask spread as the last ask price prior to the block trade minus the last bid 
price before the block trade, divided by the midpoint of both prices. Marketreturn is the 
contract-specific daily return on the ECX EUA index for each contract. By adopting contract-
specific return we emulate Frino, Jarnecic, and Lepone (2007) in using a more refined 
measure of market return. Alzahrani, Gregoriou, and Hudson (2013) and Frino, Jarnecic, and 
Lepone (2007) report intraday effects for block trade impact. Thus, for consistency, we 
introduce trading hour, day of week and month of year dummy variables in order to capture 
trading time/period effects. For these sets of dummies, the last trading hour (16:01-17:00), 
Friday and December are employed as references. The use of December as a reference month 
is important given that the contracts in our sample all have December expiries. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1.  Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A in Table 1 shows descriptive statistics based on trade classification. Of the 16,715 
block trades in our final sample, 8,356 are buyer-initiated and 8,359 are seller-initiated. The 
total volume of block trades to the total number of trades in the sample is 1.74%. In 
comparison to conventional markets, trading in a permit market like the ECX seems to be less 
dependent on institutional activity. However, this is only true if we equate block trading 
activity to institutional activity. The nature of the EU-ETS is such that emissions are capped 
and traded in the upstream; hence, trading in EU-ETS permits is dominated primarily by both 
installations trading for compliance purposes and other institutional investors, such as 
Barclays Capital. However, most institutional trading occurs OTC and in the upstairs market. 
While comprising only a small portion of EUA trades on the ECX, institutional trades 
account for a far higher proportion of the Euro volume of the exchange-based trades (see 
Mizrach and Otsubo 2014, Ibikunle, Gregoriou, and Pandit 2013). 0.869% of all the trades in 
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the final sample are identified as buyer-initiated block trades, while a marginally higher 
percentage of 0.87% are seller-initiated block trades. This trend, while conforming to some 
previous studies(for example Frino, Jarnecic, and Lepone 2007), contrasts with others (see 
for example Gregoriou 2008).  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
After removing the high-volume EFP/EFS trades from the on-screen block trades, we have a 
total of 16,715 block trades with a combined value of approximately €21 billion. For all 
block trades, the average number of contracts per trade is more than 13 times the value of all 
the trades combined (both block and non-block). The average number of trades (transaction 
value) for block purchases is higher than sales, at 80.21 (€1,258,030) and 77.67 (€1,207,400), 
respectively. The average relative bid-ask spread value is 0.067% for purchases and 0.056% 
for sales. The average relative bid-ask spreads for all trades compare favourably with those 
of all block trades. With the exception of block purchases, the spread for all trades is higher 
than all classes in Table 1. For more developed markets and traditional asset classes, the 
expectation would be to have reduced spreads for all trades and larger spreads for block 
trades, since they are more likely to be influenced by private information rather than the 
search for liquidity. A number of microstructure studies suggest that large-sized trades are 
more informative than smaller ones (see Easley and O'Hara 1987 for further details). 
Investors have been known to fragment trades over a period of time in order to take 
advantage of private information rather than execute an abnormally large trade; they do this 
in order to avoid revealing the privately held information before they can take advantage of it. 
To some extent, the results in Table 1 showing block purchases with a higher average number 
of contracts per trade seem to confirm this intuition. It is also noted that all trades, which is 
approximately 11 times smaller than the average block trade, has a slightly higher average 
relative spread. A possible explanation is the noisy nature of price discovery during the 
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trading day on the ECX. Noise in the price discovery process and information asymmetry on 
the ECX have been documented by Ibikunle, Gregoriou, and Pandit (2013). In any case, the 
statistics presented in Table 1 are not by themselves conclusive evidence of noise in our data. 
Also, if noise is synonymous with trading on a platform, we must ensure that the data are 
representative of this fact; results presented in Section 5 will provide clearer insights.  
 
4.2. Regression Results and Discussion 
4.2.1. Price impact and trade sign 
We investigate the determinants of price impact of block trades for all, purchase, and 
sell transactions separately in this section; Table 2 shows the results. Size coefficient 
estimates for sell block trades are all highly statistically significant and negative. The 
coefficients confirm that larger sell block trades have both permanent and temporary impacts 
on the price of carbon futures on the ECX, implying that the larger the block trade, the bigger 
the negative sell block trade impact. The temporary effects, however, contradict expectations, 
since price should fall after a sell trade; further analysis examines this curious relationship. 
There are further and substantial instances of this relationship evident in the results given in 
Table 2. On the one hand there is sufficient evidence to show that block trades on the ECX 
induce statistically significant price impact; on the other hand, these impacts do not conform 
to the established literature stream for conventional markets. For example, the total effects of 
block purchases are negative and statistically significant for all of Volatility, Marketreturn, 
Momentum and BAS. The corresponding total effects coefficients for combined block trades 
are also negative and statistically significant for all of those variables, with the exception of 
Volatility. This implies that purchase block trades dominate the direction of block trade 
impact, since the sell block trade total impact coefficients are mostly positive. However, only 
a fraction of the values obtained support this conclusion. It is misleading to focus on the total 
price impact estimates, since it is difficult to tell which of the two key impact types 
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(liquidity/temporary and information/permanent) is predominant. For clarity, we examine the 
temporary and permanent impact estimates in Table 2. Here, the block purchase price effects 
are more in keeping with existing literature. For example, the positive (and statistically 
significant) temporary effects Volatility, and Marketreturn estimates for the purchase trades 
are consistent with theory and the current literature (see for example, Alzahrani, Gregoriou, 
and Hudson 2013, Chiyachantana et al. 2004).
7
 The literature suggests that increased depth 
(Turnover) reduces block trade price impact. Our results imply that this is only supported for 
purchases in the case of total price impact. Temporary effects estimates for both purchases 
and sales suggest that for liquidity-induced trades, market depth does not dull trade impact; 
the direction of impact remains consistent. Only the block sale coefficient is significant for 
permanent effects, contradicting Frino, Jarnecic, and Lepone (2007), but supporting 
Alzahrani, Gregoriou, and Hudson’s (2013) work on the Saudi Stock Market (SSM). 
Alzahrani, Gregoriou, and Hudson (2013) suggest that huge block sell trades in actively 
traded instruments may signal adverse information about the intent of the trades, since they 
indicate beliefs of informed participants and consequently lead to an increase in instrument 
sales. This can lead to intensification of the price impact of the block trades involved.  
Positive Marketreturn coefficient estimates indicate larger price impact for purchase 
block trades, and reduced impact for block sell trades; results obtained are largely in keeping 
with this expectation. Consistent with Frino, Jarnecic, and Lepone (2007) and Alzahrani, 
Gregoriou, and Hudson (2013), they are positive for the full range of price effects for the 
block sell trades. The permanent effects and temporary effects estimates for the purchase 
trades are positive as well. According to Chiyachantana et al. (2004), institutional block 
trades executed on the back of price appreciation lead to lesser permanent price impact. This 
corroborates Saar (2001), which reports that block trades executed following a recent price 
run-up generate smaller price impact. The total effects Momentum coefficient estimates show 
statistically significant results. The total effects coefficient estimate for purchase block trades 
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is negative and significant, indicating lesser price impact as a result of price run-up. The 
negative and statistically significant sell coefficient (total effects) implies the opposite trend 
holds for sell block trades. The statistically significant BAS estimates (purchase: total effects; 
sell: total and permanent effects) imply that with wider spreads, there is reduced price impact 
for both purchase and sell trades, and thus with narrower spreads, there is greater price 
impact. This contradicts previous studies (see for example Aitken and Frino 1996, Gemmill 
1996). The ECX is a platform created for trading emission permits, unlike equity markets 
aimed at trading stocks. Emission permits are designed to be submitted only once a year, but 
the market remains very liquid all year round since the commencement of Phase II of the EU-
ETS (see Montagnoli and de Vries 2010, Ibikunle, Gregoriou, and Pandit 2013). Trading 
emission permits when they are not immediately needed for submission indicates a level of 
informed trading. Based on this reasoning, high levels of liquidity may not necessarily inhibit 
price impact for block trades. The BAS estimates support those obtained for the Turnover 
variable. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Buyer- and seller-initiated block trades on the ECX induce both temporary and permanent 
price impacts. Increased liquidity also generates a larger price impact. The dissimilarities in 
market properties between the EU-ETS cap and trade scheme and traditional financial 
markets is underscored by the differences in the impact of the two liquidity measures used in 
the model. Evidence also confirms the prediction that there is reduced price impact for both 
purchase and sell block trades when an instrument is on a price run-up prior to the block trade 
execution. 
 
4.2.2. Intraday variations in price impact 
In conventional markets, it has been reported that spreads conform to a U-shaped pattern over 
the trading day. However, little has been reported on intraday variations in the EU-ETS. 
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Rotfuβ (2009) reports a roughly U-shaped pattern of intraday volatility on the ECX using 
ECX data from the first year of trading in Phase II (2008). Ibikunle, Gregoriou, and Pandit 
(2013) report a slightly different inverted S-shaped intraday pattern of volatility and trading 
volume using data from the same platform. To our knowledge, the only available evidence of 
intraday variations in estimated spread pattern available for the EU-ETS is the work of 
Ibikunle, Gregoriou, and Pandit (2013). The authors, using the Huang and Stoll (1997) spread 
decomposition model, obtain half-spread estimates for several trading intervals on the ECX; 
they depict a kind of U-shaped evolution of intraday half-spread. Figure 1 shows intraday 
variations in the average relative bid-ask spread, computed by using our entire dataset 
(including non-block trades). There is a discernible suggestion of a U-shaped pattern 
emerging. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
In order to examine the presence of intraday variations in the intensity of block trade price 
impact for the ECX, we introduce intraday dummies for each trading hour, and the results are 
also presented in Table 2.
8
 The intervals are as defined in Section 4, and Table 2 also contains 
the relevant results. Results suggest that block trades executed during some intervals of the 
trading day generate price impacts, which are significantly different from those, generated by 
trades executed during the last hour of the day. The middle of the trading day, between 11am 
and 3pm, shows a propensity for inducing a larger sell block price impact than the last hour 
of the trading day. The difference in the effect of intraday trading activity patterns on the 
ECX and other traditional financial platforms is underscored by this behaviour. Some studies 
show that the first hour of trading has been reported as the period when block trades induce 
the largest price impact (see Frino, Jarnecic, and Lepone 2007 as an example). Earlier in this 
section, we report that, contrary to earlier studies, wider spreads in fact characterise less price 
impact on the ECX. This result is therefore the only logical outcome of our investigation of 
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time of day effect. This is because Figure 1 shows that the lowest spreads are experienced 
during the middle of the day, and the highest spread intervals happen during the first hour of 
the trading day. There is, however, some evidence of price impact asymmetry, since some of 
the block purchase coefficients are negative and significant. This trend suggests that during 
the 4
th
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 hours of the trading day, block purchases induce less total price impact 
than for the last hour of the trading day. Further examination of the results shows that for 
temporary effects, which proxies the liquidity component of price shifts, there is no evidence 
of the price impact asymmetry observed for total effects. This set of results underscores the 
observation of Ibikunle, Gregoriou, and Pandit (2013) that the last hour of trading on the 
ECX is dominated by informed trading and thus is likely to exhibit larger levels of permanent 
price impact due to new information being impounded into the prices. This is because the 
final trading hour is largely dominated by purchase traders; this also explains the price impact 
asymmetry with block sells. 
 
4.2.3. Day of the week and Month of the year effects 
We compute and compare mean price impact measures for each day of the week and each 
month of the year. We observe weak but significant differences in price impact in the day of 
the week analysis. This leads us to expect some level of price impact variations on account of 
trading day, hence the decision to include day of the week dummies in Equation (4) The 
month of the year analysis yield stronger evidence of significant differences, therefore we 
also include month dummies in Equation (4); December, the delivery month for all the 
futures used in this study, is employed as the reference month. Results presented in Table 2 
suggest that while there are some statistically significant differences in the price impact of 
block trades on account of trading day of the week, these are restricted to block purchases 
only and only exist in the case of total effects. Further, the level of statistical significance is 
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generally weak. Thus, we document another instance of price impact asymmetry on the basis 
of block trade type. 
Table 2 also presents the results for the month of year dummies. The results are quite 
interesting: we observe strong price impact asymmetry between block purchases and sells. 
For total effects, all 11 sell block month dummies are statistically significant, and eight are 
for permanent effects. None of the purchase block month dummies meet the conventional 
level of statistical significance. Cases of observed price impact asymmetry between trade 
types are quite common in microstructure literature; in the conclusion to this paper, we 
attempt an explanation of this phenomenon as it applies to this unusual market. The results 
obtained for block sells strongly suggest that the price impact for sell block trades is highest 
in December. Since we eliminate December trades for maturing contracts from our sample, 
this is expected. The elimination of the December trades of the contract closest to maturity 
means that December trades may be relatively less volatile than trades in the other months of 
the year. The Volatility coefficients in Table 2 suggest that there is reduced price impact with 
increasing volatility in the market. Thus, other months, being relatively more volatile than 
December, would experience less sell block trade impacts.   
    
4.2.4. Trade size dependencies on price impact 
Microstructure studies suggest that liquidity-influenced trades are characterised by small 
orders, and informed trades by larger orders (see Glosten and Harris 1988 as an example). 
Ibikunle, Gregoriou, and Pandit’s (2013) analyses of the large orders that dominate the after-
hours session on the ECX indicate a confirmation of this proposition in the European carbon 
futures market. If different types of trades are characterised by differing sizes of trades, it is 
suspected that block trades will not uniformly induce price impact. To determine how block 
trades of different sizes can affect price functioning, we adopt the approach of Alzahrani, 
Gregoriou, and Hudson(2013) and Madhavan and Cheng (1997) in dividing block trades in 
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our sample into three different trade size categories. We divide block trades into three groups, 
as follows: 50,000-100,000 EUAs (small), 100,001-200,000 EUAs (mid) and >200,000 
EUAs (large). Equation (4) is estimated for the three groups using all three measures of price 
impact. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Table 3 reports the results for purchase block trades. The first observation we make is that of 
a very high proportion of small block trades. Approximately 90% of executed trades in the 
sample are for small blocks. Another observation is the dearth of estimates significantly 
different from zero. Also, the results are largely consistent with Table 2, especially for the 
small blocks, since they dominate the sample. However, a few observations deserve mention. 
As stated earlier, positive market return induces greater permanent price impact; there is now 
further evidence that this is linked to trade size. The large purchase block trades on average 
effect 26.26% more permanent price shifts when market return is positive than the small 
purchase block trades; this is because larger trades convey more information to the market. 
Conversely and expectedly, owing to the fact that temporary price impacts are composed of 
liquidity effects, the small purchase block trades cause on average 78.28% more temporary 
price shifts than the large trades. It is also noted that the large coefficient estimate for 
temporary effects is not even significantly different from zero.  
We also observe that the larger blocks, especially the mid-size blocks, potentially 
induce higher price impact, in line with theory, than smaller sized ones. For example, 
consider the Volatility variable, which measures the dispersion of participants’ belief, its 
(Volatility) total effects estimates for all three trade sizes are statistically significant. The 
coefficient of the mid-size blocks is positive and statistically significant, and also higher than 
the other groups at 1.44. This means that for this group, increasing volatility leads to higher 
price impact. The negative and statistically significant coefficients for the small and large 
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blocks imply that increased volatility does not necessarily imply higher price impact; it 
instead signals the opposite. This is consistent with earlier total effects coefficient estimates 
for purchase block trades from Table 2. Since these two groups account for more than 93% of 
the sample size, the consistency with earlier results on purchase trades is not surprising, but 
the mid-size blocks estimate is consistent with theory. The total effects coefficient estimates 
for Momentum are statistically significant for all three sizes; again the results suggest that 
mid-size blocks induce higher price impact on a price run-up, as reported by Frino, Jarnecic, 
and Lepone (2007), while results on the other two sizes confirm the argument of Saar (2001) 
and results in Table 2. The negative and statistically significant coefficients confirm that less 
price impact is induced on a price run-up.  
Differentiation (outright dominance) of the mid-size blocks group from (over) the 
largest blocks category is consistent with the hypothesis and evidence presented by Barclay 
and Warner (1993) after testing block trade price impacts on NYSE stock prices. In their 
sample, most of the cumulative stock price change is due to medium-sized trades. Here, the 
interesting pattern evolving may be an indication of 100,000 EUAs becoming the threshold 
for price impact effects. Already, we show that the small blocks induce more temporary than 
permanent price impact, thus implying that most of the trades in this group are liquidity 
seeking. This, coupled with the large volume of small blocks of 50,000 EUAs, suggests a 
gradual erosion of the market’s view of a 50,000 EUA-worth trade as a block trade. The ECX 
sets the standard for what is regarded as a block trade, and currently it stands at 50,000 EUAs, 
according to exchange rules. Markets have, however, been known to induce structural shifts 
in response to emerging trading culture. The ECX, as an EU-ETS platform, is a product of 
political action and may not be subject to the same expectations as regular markets developed 
as engines of wealth creation. Even still, the market seems to be gradually taking on a life of 
its own. This, however, does not explain why the largest block category shows fewer price 
impact effects than the mid-size category. Barclay and Warner (1993) argue that under 
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certain conditions, informed traders, rather than trading in large sizes, would usually split up 
their trades into smaller chunks that fall into the medium-sized category, hence the 
asymmetric phenomenon. Also, we suggest the following: the frequency of on-screen 
purchase block trades >200,000 EUAs on the ECX (3.45%) over three years and four months 
is very low. The low frequency levels may be a contributing factor to the low coefficient 
estimates. Perhaps infrequent trade sizes are likely to induce less price reaction than those 
that are fairly regular. Further, in our dataset, more than 98% of the large blocks occur 
outside of the first hour of the normal trading day. The total effects coefficient for the mid-
size category indicates that greater price impact occurs during the first hour of the trading day 
for this group of trades. Therefore, since trades during the other periods in the day are less 
likely to induce price impact than those executed during the first hour, the effects of the large 
blocks may have been consequently muted by a general reduced price reaction to such trades 
during the other periods of the normal trading day. The R
2
 values for the equation estimations 
range from 2.32% to 24.84% for total effects estimates, which is an indication of the 
significant explanatory power of the model, especially for the large block trades. This further 
evidences their informativeness. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Table 4 shows the results for sell block trades. We observe trends similar to those in Table 3, 
with approximately 91% of executed trades in the sample made up of the small blocks. Also, 
as in the purchase estimates, there is a dearth of coefficients that are significantly different 
from zero. Like the purchase block results, the results in Table 4 are consistent with sell 
blocks estimates in Table 2. However, unlike with the purchase blocks, the small sell blocks 
contribute more to the direction of price impact observed in Table 2 than the larger blocks. 
The only exception seems to be for temporary effects due to volatility, which is principally 
driven by the mid-size blocks. The negative and statistically significant value of the mid-size 
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blocks shows that increased volatility results in higher price impact for midsize blocks. The 
opposite is the case for the small and large blocks. Consistent with Alzahrani, Gregoriou, and 
Hudson (2013), the significant total effects coefficient for the small blocks is larger than for 
the larger sizes. This indicates that smaller sized sell block trades are more informative than 
larger ones. Professional traders have long been known to split large block trades into smaller 
trades to avoid early detection of their information content (see Barclay and Warner 1993, 
Chakravarty 2001). Although microstructure studies show that informed trades are 
discernible also from the direction and frequency of trades, trades fragmentation potentially 
mutes the price impact of block trades (Keim and Madhavan 1996). The permanent effects 
coefficients for Marketreturn seem to support this view; thus, there are larger price impacts 
for the small sell blocks, as they are perceived as being more informative. 
Another interesting set of results to note in Table 4 is the fact that Momentum 
coefficients are negative all through, consistent with Table 2. When viewed in tandem with 
the block purchase estimates in previous tables, we can argue that block purchase trades 
behaviour on the ECX is largely consistent with Saar (2001) (cumulative lagged returns 
reduce price impact), and that of sell block trades with Frino, Jarnecic, and Lepone (2007) 
(larger price run-ups lead to larger price impact). The time-related dummies results are 
qualitatively similar to sell blocks estimates in Table 2. The R
2
 values are generally larger 
than for previous regressions, with the model being more fitted to explaining price impact for 
the large sell blocks; the R
2
 values range from 20.89% to 25.17% for the largest sized sell 
blocks. The general trend exhibited in Table 4 suggests that sell block trades executed on the 
ECX on the whole are less likely to induce price impact than purchase block trades. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The key finding of this study is that the price impact of block trades in emissions permit 
markets is largely different from the price impact of block trades in conventional financial 
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markets, with emissions permit markets experiencing generally lower price impact than 
traditional financial markets. Block trades increasingly constitute large Euro volumes of 
trades in the EU-ETS, as more installations try to avoid counterparty risks by trading on 
platforms rather than OTC; in any case, most OTC trades are registered on exchanges to 
avoid such risks. Our study therefore is of significance to CFI traders and exchange operators 
alike. By examining the determinants of block trades, we improve understanding of the 
impact of larger than regular trades on an environmental platform. This understanding is 
useful for regulators and exchange operators, and it will contribute to the development of 
market design considerations. For example, for purchase blocks, we find little evidence of 
large impact for ECX block trades within the threshold of 50,000-100,000 EUAs and above 
the threshold of 200,000 EUAs; instead, the impact is stronger for the mid-size blocks 
between 100,000 to 200,000 EUAs. This suggests a disparity between the platform operator’s 
expectation of price and trading dynamics, and the view of the market participants. 
Results show that most of the block trades on the ECX occur at the minimum quantity 
for the exchange-sanctioned block trade size of 50,000 EUAs. This is consistent for both 
buyer- and seller-initiated block trades; it also indicates that traders on either side of block 
trades on the ECX employ identical trading tactics in terms of order placing. The evidence 
suggests that stealth trading is a strategy being employed by most block traders on the 
platform. The low volume of block trades – 16,715 (1.74%) out of a total of 961,131 trades in 
our final sample – also suggests that hitherto block trading intentions may have been 
executed by splitting aggregate large orders into traded quantities below the block trade 
threshold of 50,000 EUAs. This suggestion is reinforced by the nature of the EU-ETS, where 
most participants are either big compliance traders or institutional investors, who are 
expected to be trading in large quantities. In comparison with conventional instruments, the 
price impact of carbon futures on the ECX is small and largely statistically insignificant. 
Lack of price reaction to large trades can be viewed as a possible consequence of thin trading 
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(see Ball and Finn 1989). Although trading has advanced in the EU-ETS, it remains very low 
in comparison to established markets. Since there is little price reaction, there is very little 
opportunity to benefit from price shocks. We find some proof of price impact asymmetry for 
buyer- and seller-initiated block trades. Some results also suggest that sellers pay a premium, 
rather than buyers, on buyer-initiated trades, which clearly contradicts many studies. 
However, it is not surprising that sellers rather than buyers pay a premium on the ECX when 
the market structure is considered. The ECX is a derivatives exchange for emission permits, 
which are required for submission only once a year; hence, for most trading days the permits 
are largely hedging instruments. Compliance buyers do not need to hold on to the underlying 
instruments all year round and therefore only need to take long positions in the market to 
ensure that they are insulated against penalties for non-compliance. In the event that they are 
in possession of excess instruments, they can undertake a short position. Considering that the 
permits hold little value to a compliance trader unless they are being submitted, many may 
make concessions to sell them even when the trade is buyer-initiated, and such a realisation 
may trigger the buyer’s interest in the first place.  
This paper also provides evidence that lower price impact is characterised by wider 
spreads. For buyer-initiated block orders, trade execution induces larger price impact in the 
ECX during the middle of the trading day than during the first and last trading hours. We find 
evidence in support of positive price run-up leading to both lower price impact and higher 
price impact, depending on the trade sign. For block purchases, there is smaller price impact 
when a trade occurs after a price run-up; for block sales, there is greater price impact. There 
is, however, also a block trade size dependency to this, as shown in Section 5. In many cases, 
the most information-laden trades are not the largest ones, but the medium (for most 
purchases) and small (for most sells) trades. Policy makers must therefore ensure that 
regulations in the emissions markets keep pace with trading innovations. Our findings also 
have implications for the participants in the EU-ETS who must trade in emissions 
27 
 
instruments for the purpose of compliance. This class of participants is more likely to trade in 
large blocks; thus, our findings can inform their trading strategies. Specifically, the 
dissimilarities to conventional platforms that we document in this paper underscore the need 
for trading re-orientation to attain a required level of trading sophistication in the market. The 
message is clear: this market has a rather curious bent. 
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Notes 
1. Project-based permits include Certified Emission Reduction Units (CER) and 
Emission Reduction Units (ERU) from Clean Development Mechanism and Joint 
Implementation (JI), respectively (see Daskalakis, Ibikunle, and Diaz-Rainey 2011). 
2. We also use the tick rule algorithm (see Lee and Ready 1991), with comparable 
results. 
3. For robustness, we consider analysis based on volume-weighted price impact 
measures in order to eliminate some of the noise in the data, if indeed this was 
prominent. We find that the results are quantitatively similar. The major reason for 
this is that approximately 90% of the block trades are in the 50,000-100,000 EUAs 
size category, thus the trades mainly have a similar multiplying factor.  
4. We also use the plain number of instruments traded, the natural logarithm of the Euro 
value of the block trades, the instrument volume relative to the average daily 
instrument volume, and the Euro value relative to the average daily trading Euro value. 
As is the case with Frino, Jarnecic, and Lepone (2007), the natural logarithm of the 
number of instruments traded provides the best fit. 
5. We also use standard deviation of the execution price of trades, in line with Alzahrani 
et al. (2013). The results are quantitatively similar. 
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6. We also use open interest on its own as a measure of liquidity; however, the results 
obtained are less significant across all the models. 
7. The expectation is for higher levels of volatility to lead to higher block trade price 
impact. Thus, block purchases will induce positively skewed price impact and sell 
block trades will induce negative price impact when the market becomes relatively 
more volatile. 
8. We also divide the trading day into three intervals, in line with previous studies, in 
order to test the intraday period dependencies. The results are qualitatively similar. 
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Figure 1 
Intraday Variations in Relative Bid-ask Spread on the ECX 
 
Note: The figure shows the prevailing intraday relative bid-ask spread pattern for all trades of December maturity EUA Futures contracts executed on the European Climate 
Exchange (ECX) platform between January 2008 and April 2011. Average bid-ask spread, which is defined for each trade as the last ask price prior to the trade minus the last 
bid price before the trade, divided by the average of both prices, is computed for each of the six EUA Futures contracts in our sample and then averaged cross-sectionally 
across all contracts. 
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Table 1 
Panel A Summary Statistics for Block Trades 
  
Number of 
trades 
Average number of 
contracts/trade 
% of total number 
of trades 
Average 
transaction 
value/trade 
(€‘000) 
Average Relative 
Spread (%) 
Standard 
deviation (%) 
All trades 961,131   6.79  108.40  0.07  
Block trades   16,715 78.94 1.74 1,232.71  0.06 0.47 
Block 
purchases 
   8,356 80.21 0.87 1,258.03  0.07 0.58 
Block sales    8,359 77.67 0.87  1,207.40  0.06 0.30 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix for Determinants 
 BAS Market Return Momentum Volatility Size Turnover 
BAS 1      
Market 
Return 
-0.017 1     
Momentum -0.023 0.261 1    
Volatility 0.322 0.001 -0.041 1   
Size -0.012 0.016 -0.002 -0.019 1  
Turnover -0.080 0.076 0.152 -0.257 0.006 1 
Note: Panel A shows descriptive statistics for block trades of December maturity EUA futures executed on the European Climate Exchange (ECX) platform between January 
2008 and April 2012. Panel B shows the correlation matrix of the determinants of price impact of block trades, the determinants/variables are as defined in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Determinants of Price Impact of Block Trades 
 Permanent effects  Total effects  Temporary effects 
 All Purchase Sell  All Purchase Sell  All Purchase Sell 
Variables            
Size 
-3.25E-05 
(1.74E-05) 
-1.47E-05 
(2.59E-05) 
-0.0004*** 
(0.0002) 
 
-1.78E-05 
(1.04E-05) 
0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0002** 
(9.84E-05) 
 
-1.34E-05 
(1.73E-05) 
-2.68E-05 
(2.65E-05) 
0.0001*** 
(1.17E-05) 
Volatility 
0.1820* 
(0.0944) 
0.0817 
(0.1318) 
0.0399** 
(0.0188) 
 
0.0317 
(0.1201) 
-0.0417** 
(0.0200) 
0.0285*** 
(0.0080) 
 
0.0735** 
(0.0377) 
0.1396*** 
(0.0391) 
-0.0109 
(0.0673) 
Turnover 
-0.0733 
(0.1367) 
-0.0740 
(0.2075) 
-0.1817*** 
(0.0552) 
 
-0.1357* 
(0.0801) 
-0.2657** 
(0.1211) 
0.0340 
(0.0946) 
 
0.0530*** 
(0.0129) 
0.1730* 
(0.0944) 
-0.1158*** 
(0.0193) 
Market 
Return 
0.0157*** 
(0.0060) 
0.0102 
(0.0099) 
0.0174*** 
(0.0054) 
 
-0.0147*** 
(0.0046) 
-0.0248*** 
(0.0080) 
0.0124*** 
(0.0032) 
 
0.0204*** 
(0.0070) 
0.0350*** 
(0.0124) 
0.0150*** 
(0.0049) 
Momentum 
-0.0031 
(0.0020) 
-0.0041* 
(0.0025) 
-0.0020 
(0.0023) 
 
-0.0028** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0040*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0016** 
(0.0013) 
 
-0.0005 
(0.0025) 
-0.0003 
(0.0040) 
-0.0004 
(0.0019) 
BAS 
-0.08107 
(0.0641) 
-0.0833 
(0.0544) 
0.0649** 
(0.0306) 
 
-0.1994** 
(0.0924) 
-0.1006*** 
(0.0415) 
0.1318*** 
(0.0370) 
 
0.0273 
(0.0946) 
0.1291 
(0.1266) 
0.0319 
(0.0770) 
TD1 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
0.0004 
(0.0009) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
 
-9.53E-06 
(0.0002) 
-0.0006* 
(0.0003) 
0.0003* 
(0.0002) 
 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
0.0009 
(0.0010) 
5.45E-05 
(0.0002) 
TD2 
0.0006 
(0.0005) 
0.0012 
(0.0010) 
-2.74E-05 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-8.88E-05 
(0.0001) 
 
0.0008 
(0.0005) 
0.0014 
(0.0010) 
6.17E-05 
(0.0002) 
TD3 
0.0006 
(0.0005) 
0.0010 
(0.0009) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
 
-7.30E-05 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
9.91E-05 
(0.0001) 
 
0.0007 
(0.0005) 
0.0012 
(0.0009) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
TD4 
0.0006 
(0.0005) 
0.0011 
(0.0009) 
5.40E-05 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
 
0.0008 
(0.0005) 
0.0016* 
(0.0009) 
-5.84E-05 
(0.0002) 
TD5 
0.0002 
(0.0005) 
0.0008 
(0.0009) 
-0.0005** 
(0.0003) 
 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0008*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
 
0.0006 
(0.0005) 
0.0016* 
(0.0009) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
TD6 
0.0008* 
(0.0005) 
0.0013 
(0.0009) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0005) 
0.0003* 
(0.0002) 
 
0.0005 
(0.0005) 
0.0010 
(0.0010) 
9.21E-05 
(0.0002) 
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TD7 
0.0007 
(0.0005) 
0.0012 
(0.0009) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0005 
(0.0003) 
7.00E-05 
(0.0001) 
 
0.0009* 
(0.0005) 
0.0017 
(0.0009) 
7.43E-05 
(0.0002) 
TD8 
0.0002 
(0.0005) 
0.0007 
(0.0009) 
-0.0005* 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0004* 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
 
0.0005 
(0.0005) 
0.0011 
(0.0009) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
TD9 
0.0005 
(0.0005) 
0.0010 
(0.0009) 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0001) 
 
0.0007 
(0.0005) 
0.0013 
(0.0009) 
8.75E-05 
(0.0002) 
DD1 
5.48E-05 
(0.0005) 
-0.0002 
(0.0010) 
0.00023 
(0.0003) 
 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004* 
(0.0003) 
3.21E-05 
(0.0001) 
 
0.0002 
(0.0005) 
0.0003 
(0.0010) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
DD2 
0.0003 
(0.0004) 
0.0005 
(0.0008) 
2.96E-05 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
-0.0004 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
 
0.0005 
(0.0004) 
0.0009 
(0.0008) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
DD3 
0.0004 
(0.0004) 
0.0007 
(0.0008) 
7.64E-05 
(0.0002) 
 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
7.70E-05 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
 
0.0003 
(0.0004) 
0.0007 
(0.0008) 
-4.50E-05 
(0.0002) 
DD4 
0.0001 
(0.0004) 
0.0004 
(0.0008) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
-0.0002** 
(0.0002) 
-4.31E-05 
(0.0001) 
 
0.0003 
(0.0004) 
0.0009 
(0.0008) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
MD1 
0.0005 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0006) 
0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
 
0.0005*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
 
-1.76E-05 
(0.0003) 
5.21E-05 
(0.0005) 
-9.67E-05 
(0.0003) 
MD2 
0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
0.0005 
(0.0005) 
0.0009*** 
(0.0003) 
 
0.0006*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0007 
(0.0005) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
 
6.07E-05 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0005) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
MD3 
0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0005) 
0.0008** 
(0.0003) 
 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-7.33E-05 
(0.0003) 
0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0005) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
MD4 
-8.85E-06 
(0.0007) 
-0.0006 
(0.0013) 
0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
 
0.0003* 
(0.0002) 
8.71E-05 
(0.0003) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.0003 
(0.0007) 
-0.0007 
(0.0013) 
8.85E-05 
(0.0003) 
MD5 
-8.92E-05 
(0.0003) 
-0.0005 
(0.0005) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-8.97E-05 
(0.0003) 
0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0004 
(0.0005) 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
MD6 
0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
0.0005 
(0.0005) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0004) 
 
0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
MD7 
0.0007* 
(0.0004) 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
0.0013*** 
(0.0004) 
 
0.0003 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0004) 
0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0005) 
0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
MD8 
0.0005 
(0.0004) 
0.0006 
(0.0005) 
0.0005 
(0.0004) 
 
0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0005) 
-0.0001 
(0.0004) 
MD9 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
 
0.0004* 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0005) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
 
2.49E-05 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0005) 
-8.87E-05 
(0.0003) 
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MD10 
0.0004 
(0.0004) 
0.0002 
(0.0005) 
0.0005 
(0.0004) 
 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-6.68E-06 
(0.0003) 
0.0004* 
(0.0002) 
 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0005) 
7.57E-05 
(0.0003) 
MD11 
-0.0004 
(0.0007) 
-0.0011 
(0.0013) 
0.0006* 
(0.0003) 
 
0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.0007 
(0.0007) 
-0.0013 
(0.0005) 
8.02E-05 
(0.0003) 
Constant 
-0.001 
(0.0007) 
-0.0018 
(0.0013) 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
-1.25E-05 
(0.0005) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.0010 
(0.0007) 
-0.0019 
(0.0014) 
4.32E-05 
(0.0003) 
Observations 16715 8356 8359  16715 8356 8359  16715 8356 8359 
R-squared 0.0022 0.0024 0.0230  0.0072 0.0218 0.0269  0.0026 0.0044 0.0081 
            
 
Note: The table reports regression results for all purchase and sell block trades of December maturity EUA futures contracts executed on the European Climate Exchange 
(ECX) platform between January 2008 and April 2011. The coefficients are reported along with the standard errors (in parenthesis). The following regression is estimated 
using OLS with Newey and West (1987) heteroscedastic and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix: 
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where PIt  corresponds to one of three price impact measures: total price impact, permanent price impact and temporary price impact. The explanatory variables are computed 
as follows. Xt is a vector of six explanatory variables (Size, Volatility, Turnover, Marketreturn, Momentum and BAS) defined below. TDi, DDi and MDi are dummy variables 
for time (hour) of day, day of week and month of year and are further defined below. Size represents the natural logarithm of the number of December maturity futures 
contracts for each block trade; Volatility is the standard deviation of trade to trade returns prior to the block trade on the trading day; Turnover is the natural logarithm of the 
futures contracts turnover on the trading day prior to the block trade, turnover is the ratio of total trade volume prior to the block to the prevailing open interest estimates; 
Marketreturn is the return of EUA Futures contract specific index computed by the ECX; Momentum corresponds to the cumulative return on the specific EUA Futures 
contract in the five days prior to the block trade; BAS is the prevailing relative bid-ask spread at the time the block trade is executed, BAS is measured as the last ask price 
prior to the block trade minus the last bid price before the block trade, divided by the average of both prices. TD1 to TD9 equal 1 if the block trade occurs in any of the 
corresponding hour of trade from the first hour (1) to the ninth hour (9) of the trading day, and 0 otherwise. DD1 to DD4 equal 1 if the block trade occurs in any of the 
corresponding day of the week from Monday (1) to Thursday (4) of the trading week, and 0 otherwise. Any of MD1 to MD11 equals 1 if the block trade occurs in any of the 
corresponding months of the year from January (1) to November (11) and 0 otherwise. One EUA Futures contract has an underlying of 1,000 EUAs. ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 3 
Determinants of Price Impact and Block Trade Sizes (Purchases) 
 Permanent effects  Total effects  Temporary effects 
 
% Proportion 
50-100 
(89.92%) 
101-200 
(6.63%) 
>200 
(3.45%) 
 
50-100 
(89.92%) 
101-200 
(6.63%) 
>200 
(3.45%) 
 
50-100 
(89.92%) 
101-200 
(6.63%) 
>200 
(3.45%) 
Variables            
Size 
8.40E-06 
(8.88E-06) 
4.01E-05 
(2.90E-05) 
2.38E-06 
(1.73E-06) 
 
-5.37E-08 
(3.82E-06) 
2.86E-06 
(1.08E-05) 
4.81E-06** 
(2.11E-06) 
 
8.83E-06 
(8.56E-06) 
3.81E-05 
(3.02E-05) 
-2.35E-06 
(2.10E-06) 
Volatility 
0.0455 
(0.1515) 
1.1161*** 
(0.4051) 
-0.2610 
(0.2120) 
 
-1.0946*** 
(0.2200) 
1.4354** 
(0.6454) 
-1.0247*** 
(0.3711) 
 
0.1881 
(0.2073) 
-0.2271 
(0.7360) 
-0.0372 
(0.4340) 
Turnover 
-0.1514 
(0.4487) 
-0.6615 
(0.6125) 
0.0529 
(0.1749) 
 
-0.3513 
(0.2838) 
-0.3675 
(0.3304) 
-0.2470** 
(0.1228) 
 
0.1578 
(0.4527) 
-0.3157 
(0.5964) 
0.2986 
(0.1260) 
Market Return 
0.0179** 
(0.0077) 
-0.0810 
(0.0971) 
0.0226* 
(0.0140) 
 
    0.0212*** 
(0.0080) 
-0.0749** 
(0.0378) 
0.0002 
(0.0253) 
 
0.0394*** 
(0.0107) 
-0.0089 
(0.1006) 
0.0221 
(0.0284) 
Momentum 
-0.0043* 
(0.0026) 
-0.0379 
(0.0305) 
-0.0133* 
(0.0073) 
 
-0.0066** 
(0.0033) 
0.0385*** 
(0.0112) 
-0.0279*** 
(0.0117) 
 
0.0028 
(0.0040) 
-0.0743** 
(0.0349) 
0.0136 
(0.0200) 
BAS 
-0.0547 
(0.0529) 
-1.1884 
(0.9621) 
-0.1837 
(0.3443) 
 
-0.2725** 
(0.1193) 
-0.4582** 
(0.2073) 
-0.0021 
(0.2804) 
 
0.0310 
(0.1297) 
-0.7479 
(0.9649) 
-0.1882 
(0.4088) 
TD1 
-0.0002 
(0.0008) 
0.0078 
(0.0087) 
-0.0006 
(0.0027) 
 
-0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
-0.0018 
(0.0012) 
0.0009 
(0.0033) 
 
0.0003 
(0.0009) 
0.0095 
(0.0086) 
-0.0016 
(0.0030) 
TD2 
0.0005 
(0.0007) 
0.0090 
(0.0091) 
0.0017 
(0.0015) 
 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.0005 
(0.0010) 
0.0002 
(0.0008) 
 
0.0008 
(0.0008) 
0.0085 
(0.0091) 
0.0015 
(0.0014) 
TD3 
0.0004 
(0.0008) 
0.0082 
(0.0072) 
0.0012 
(0.0010) 
 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0007 
(0.0013) 
0.0002 
(0.0012) 
 
0.0006 
(0.0008) 
0.0089 
(0.0074) 
0.0009 
(0.0016) 
TD4 
0.0005 
(0.0008) 
0.0101 
(0.0092) 
0.0011 
(0.0010) 
 
-0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
-0.0007 
(0.0011) 
9.27E-05 
(0.0010) 
 
0.0010 
(0.0008) 
0.0108 
(0.0093) 
0.0010 
(0.0013) 
TD5 
0.0002 
(0.0008) 
0.0093 
(0.0090) 
0.0020* 
(0.0011) 
 
-0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0004 
(0.0010) 
0.0010 
(0.0011) 
 
0.0012 
(0.0008) 
0.0096 
(0.0090) 
0.0011 
(0.0012) 
TD6 
0.0006 
(0.0008) 
0.0089 
(0.0084) 
0.0014 
(0.0012) 
 
0.0002 
(0.0006) 
8.21E-05 
(0.0011) 
0.0043** 
(0.0022) 
 
0.0005 
(0.0009) 
0.0088 
(0.0085)  
-0.0029 
(0.0025) 
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TD7 
0.0006 
(0.0007) 
0.0097 
(0.0087) 
0.0013 
(0.0013) 
 
-0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
-7.63E-06 
(0.0007) 
0.0002 
(0.0010) 
 
0.0011 
(0.0008) 
0.0096 
(0.0087) 
0.0011 
(0.0016) 
TD8 
3.02E-05 
(0.0007) 
0.0089 
(0.0078) 
0.0020** 
(0.0009) 
 
-0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
0.0005 
(0.0008) 
0.0015 
(0.0012) 
 
0.0005 
(0.0007) 
0.0084 
(0.0078) 
0.0004 
(0.0013) 
TD9 
0.0003 
(0.0007) 
0.0075 
(0.0070) 
0.0025* 
(0.0014) 
 
-0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004 
(0.0008) 
-0.0001 
(0.0011) 
 
0.0007 
(0.0007) 
0.0078 
(0.0071) 
0.0026 
(0.0014) 
DD1 
0.0006 
(0.0009) 
-0.0114 
(0.0108) 
-0.0020* 
(0.0011) 
 
-0.0005 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0017) 
-0.0024 
(0.0015) 
 
0.0011 
(0.0009) 
-0.0114 
(0.0110) 
0.0003 
(0.0016) 
DD2 
0.0006 
(0.0009) 
0.0012 
(0.0016) 
-0.0006 
(0.0013) 
 
-0.0004* 
(0.0002) 
-2.42E-06 
(0.0008) 
-0.0014 
(0.0012) 
 
0.0010 
(0.0009) 
0.0012 
(0.0018) 
0.0007 
(0.0017) 
DD3 
0.0008 
(0.0009) 
0.00154 
(0.0013) 
-0.0016 
(0.0013) 
 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0004 
(0.0008) 
-0.0019 
(0.0014) 
 
0.0007 
(0.0009) 
0.0019 
(0.0015) 
0.0002 
(0.0020) 
DD4 
0.0005 
(0.0009) 
0.0003 
(0.0012) 
-0.0014 
(0.0012) 
 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
-0.0012 
(0.0008) 
-0.0023* 
(0.0012) 
 
0.0008 
(0.0009) 
0.0015 
(0.0014) 
0.0008 
(0.0016) 
MD1 
0.0003 
(0.0006) 
0.0002 
(0.0021) 
0.0015 
(0.0010) 
 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0015 
(0.0011) 
0.0010 
(0.0007) 
 
7.93E-05 
(0.0006) 
0.0016 
(0.0021) 
0.0005 
(0.0011) 
MD2 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
0.0023 
(0.0026) 
-0.0006 
(0.0009) 
 
0.0006 
(0.0005) 
0.0024 
(0.0022) 
0.0021 
(0.0018) 
 
-0.0001 
(0.0006) 
0.0002 
(0.0032) 
-0.0026 
(0.0023) 
MD3 
-7.77E-05 
(0.0005) 
0.0042 
(0.0029) 
0.0010 
(0.0007) 
 
-6.88E-05 
(0.0004) 
0.0004 
(0.0010) 
-0.0010 
(0.0012) 
 
-1.04E-06 
(0.0005) 
0.0038 
(0.0028) 
0.0020 
(0.0015) 
MD4 
-0.0009 
(0.0014) 
0.0021 
(0.0022) 
0.0007 
(0.0008) 
 
-7.69E-05 
(0.0004) 
0.0001 
(0.0011) 
0.0014 
(0.0010) 
 
-0.0008 
(0.0014) 
0.0021 
(0.0021) 
-0.0006 
(0.0010) 
MD5 
-0.0004 
(0.0005) 
-0.0008 
(0.0021) 
-0.0018 
(0.0012) 
 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.0003 
(0.0011) 
-0.0005 
(0.0010) 
 
-0.0002 
(0.0005) 
-0.0010 
(0.0021) 
-0.0013 
(0.0019) 
MD6 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
0.0011 
(0.0024) 
-0.0005 
(0.0010) 
 
0.0003 
(0.0004) 
-9.19E-07 
(0.0010) 
0.0011 
(0.0016) 
 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
0.0011 
(0.0025) 
-0.0016 
(0.0014) 
MD7 
6.23E-05 
(0.0005) 
0.0012 
(0.0019) 
0.0006 
(0.0014) 
 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.0011 
(0.0011) 
-0.0015 
(0.0026) 
 
0.0003 
(0.0006) 
0.0002 
(0.0020) 
0.0021 
(0.0019) 
MD8 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
0.0024 
(0.0028) 
0.0035*** 
(0.0013) 
 
0.0003 
(0.0004) 
-0.0011 
(0.0011) 
0.0004 
(0.0014) 
 
2.14E-05 
(0.0006) 
0.0035 
(0.0026) 
0.0032 
(0.0021) 
MD9 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
0.0017 
(0.0021) 
0.0012 
(0.0008) 
 
8.08E-05 
(0.0005) 
0.0003 
(0.0018) 
0.0025 
(0.0020) 
 
0.0003 
(0.0006) 
0.0015 
(0.0030) 
-0.0013 
(0.0017) 
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MD10 
0.0002 
(0.0005) 
-0.0014 
(0.0028) 
0.0007 
(0.0011) 
 
2.79E-05 
(0.0004) 
-0.0010 
(0.0014) 
-0.0007 
(0.0012) 
 
0.0002 
(0.0005) 
-0.0003 
(0.0030) 
0.0013 
(0.0015) 
MD11 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
-0.0147 
(0.0159) 
-0.0010 
(0.0009) 
 
0.0001 
(0.0004) 
0.0004 
(0.0013) 
-0.0005 
(0.0007) 
 
-3.26E-05 
(0.0005) 
-0.0151 
(0.0161) 
-0.0006 
(0.0011) 
Constant 
-0.0018 
(0.0017) 
-0.0136 
(0.0095) 
-0.0019 
(0.0018) 
 
0.0007 
(0.0006) 
-0.0013 
(0.0012) 
0.0020 
(0.0020) 
 
-0.0023 
(0.0018) 
-0.0126 
(0.0096) 
-0.0013 
(0.0024) 
Observations 7514 554 288  7514 554 288  7514 554 288 
R-squared 0.0027 0.0363 0.1646  0.0232 0.2208 0.2484  0.0066 0.0359 0.1901 
 
Note: The table reports regression results for all purchase block trades of December maturity EUA futures contracts executed on the European Climate Exchange (ECX) 
platform between January 2008 and April 2011. The coefficients are reported along with the standard errors (in parenthesis). The following regression is estimated using 
OLS with Newey and West (1987) heteroscedastic and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix: 
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All variables are as defined in Table 2. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 4 
Determinants of Price Impact and Block Trade Sizes (Sales) 
 Permanent effects  Total effects  Temporary effects 
 
% Proportion 
50-100 
(90.85%) 
101-200 
(5.91%) 
>200 
(3.24%) 
 
50-100 
(90.85%) 
101-200 
(5.91%) 
>200 
(3.24%) 
 
50-100 
(90.85%) 
101-200 
(5.91%) 
>200 
(3.24%) 
Variables            
Size 
-1.62E-05*** 
(4.32E-06) 
1.36E-06 
(5.83E-06) 
-3.91E-07 
(1.41E-06) 
 
-4.26E-06** 
(2.04E-06) 
-1.23E-07 
(3.09E-06) 
-2.09E-06** 
(9.42E-07) 
 
-1.99E-06 
(3.48E-06) 
1.50E-06 
(4.36E-06) 
1.71E-06 
(1.22E-06) 
Volatility 
0.0426 
(0.1167) 
0.1953 
(0.2846) 
0.1486 
(0.2211) 
 
0.2091** 
(0.0920) 
0.4329** 
(0.2094) 
-0.4295* 
(0.2576) 
 
0.0330 
(0.0698) 
-0.2366*** 
(0.0819) 
0.5814** 
(0.2700) 
Turnover 
-0.0020 
(0.0033) 
-0.0099 
(0.0037) 
0.0010 
(0.0116) 
 
0.0668 
(0.1994) 
-0.1157 
(0.2193) 
0.0682 
(0.0525) 
 
-0.2682*** 
(0.0432) 
0.0166 
(0.2173) 
-0.0680 
(0.1013) 
Market Return 
0.0182*** 
(0.0058) 
0.0158 
(0.0119) 
0.0083 
(0.0096) 
 
0.0125*** 
(0.0033) 
0.0059 
(0.0076) 
0.0247*** 
(0.0060) 
 
0.0057 
(0.0053) 
0.0099 
(0.0086) 
-0.0165* 
(0.0095) 
Momentum 
-0.0013 
(0.0025) 
-0.0063 
(0.0056) 
-0.0222*** 
(0.0062) 
 
-0.0012 
(0.0013) 
-0.0012 
(0.0027) 
-0.0111*** 
(0.0038) 
 
-9.88E-06 
(0.0021) 
-0.0051 
(0.0047) 
-0.0111** 
(0.0048) 
BAS 
0.2873** 
(0.1394) 
-0.3524*** 
(0.1290) 
0.2609 
(0.3387) 
 
0.1548 
(0.1082) 
-0.3334*** 
(0.0935) 
0.1578 
(0.3322) 
 
0.0314 
(0.0810) 
-0.0203 
(0.1322) 
0.1044 
(0.1159) 
TD1 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0007 
(0.0005) 
-0.0018 
(0.0012) 
 
0.0003* 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0004) 
-0.0018* 
(0.0010) 
 
-1.39E-05 
(0.0003) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
-7.10E-06 
(0.0007) 
TD2 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
0.0008 
(0.0006) 
-0.0003 
(0.0009) 
 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.0007 
(0.0005) 
-0.0004 
(0.0006) 
 
2.58E-05 
(0.0002) 
6.38E-05 
(0.0004) 
8.66E-05 
(0.0009) 
TD3 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.0005 
(0.0008) 
-0.0007 
(0.0008) 
 
9.14E-05 
(0.0002) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0008** 
(0.0004) 
 
7.98E-05 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0006) 
9.35E-05 
(0.0006) 
TD4 
-7.15E-05 
(0.0003) 
0.0007 
(0.0006) 
0.0012* 
(0.0007) 
 
5.55E-05 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0004) 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.0004 
(0.0004) 
0.0008 
(0.0005) 
TD5 
-0.0006** 
(0.0003) 
0.0004 
(0.0006) 
0.0004 
(0.0007) 
 
-0.0003** 
(0.0002) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
-8.39E-05 
(0.0004) 
 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
-2.58E-05 
(0.0005) 
0.0004 
(0.0006) 
TD6 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0006) 
0.0014** 
(0.0007) 
 
0.0003* 
(0.0002) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
 
6.38E-05 
(0.0002) 
7.78E-06 
(0.0005) 
0.0011* 
(0.0006) 
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TD7 
8.43E-05 
(0.0003) 
-0.0001 
(0.0005) 
0.0016** 
(0.0008) 
 
3.77E-05 
(0.0001) 
0.00012 
(0.0004) 
0.0004 
(0.0004) 
 
4.75E-05 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0004) 
0.0012 
(0.0008) 
TD8 
-0.0005** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0006 
(0.0006) 
0.0013 
(0.0009) 
 
-0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0006) 
 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0005) 
0.0011* 
(0.0006) 
TD9 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0008 
(0.0005) 
0.0020** 
(0.0008) 
 
-0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0004) 
0.0003 
(0.0006) 
 
-1.59E-05 
(0.0002) 
0.0007* 
(0.0004) 
0.0017*** 
(0.0006) 
DD1 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0001 
(0.0005) 
5.54E-05 
(0.0007) 
 
4.61E-05 
(0.0001) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0011** 
(0.0005) 
 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0004) 
0.0011* 
(0.0006) 
DD2 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
-0.0013*** 
(0.0004) 
6.51E-05 
(0.0006) 
 
-8.76E-05 
(0.0001) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0010** 
(0.0004) 
 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0010 
(0.0003) 
0.0010* 
(0.0006) 
DD3 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
3.57E-05 
(0.0005) 
-9.30E-05 
(0.0007) 
 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0006 
(0.0005) 
 
-3.55E-05 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.0005 
(0.0005) 
DD4 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0010** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0006 
(0.0007) 
 
2.06E-05 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005 
(0.0003) 
-0.0011*** 
(0.0004) 
 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0005 
(0.0004) 
0.0005 
(0.0006) 
MD1 
0.0006* 
(0.0004) 
0.0007 
(0.0006) 
0.0030** 
(0.0013) 
 
0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.0015** 
(0.0007) 
 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.0004 
(0.0004) 
0.0015* 
(0.0009) 
MD2 
0.0009** 
(0.0004) 
3.06E-05 
(0.0006) 
0.0032*** 
(0.0012) 
 
0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0004) 
0.0009 
(0.0006) 
 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0003 
(0.0004) 
0.0023*** 
(0.0008) 
MD3 
0.0007* 
(0.0003) 
5.19E-05 
(0.0006) 
0.0036*** 
(0.0010) 
 
0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
2.42E-05 
(0.0004) 
0.0016** 
(0.0006) 
 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
2.68E-05 
(0.0004) 
0.0020*** 
(0.0007) 
MD4 
0.0006* 
(0.0003) 
0.0008 
(0.0008) 
0.0029** 
(0.0011) 
 
0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0007 
(0.0005) 
0.0019*** 
(0.0007) 
 
1.87E-05 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
0.0010 
(0.0007) 
MD5 
0.0003 
(0.0004) 
-0.0001 
(0.0006) 
0.0023** 
(0.0010) 
 
0.0005** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0023*** 
(0.0007) 
 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0004) 
9.29E-05 
(0.0006) 
MD6 
0.0010** 
(0.0004) 
0.0006 
(0.0006) 
0.0024* 
(0.0013) 
 
0.0008*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0004 
(0.0004) 
0.0012 
(0.0008) 
 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0005) 
0.0011* 
(0.0007) 
MD7 
0.0013*** 
(0.0004) 
-1.44E-05 
(0.0007) 
0.0023* 
(0.0013) 
 
0.0008*** 
(0.0003) 
3.80E-05 
(0.0004) 
0.0016** 
(0.0008) 
 
0.0005 
(0.0003) 
-5.16E-05 
(0.0006) 
0.0006 
(0.0009) 
MD8 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.0009 
(0.0008) 
0.0054*** 
(0.0016) 
 
0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
0.0009 
(0.0006) 
0.0027*** 
(0.0008) 
 
-0.0003 
(0.0004) 
5.79E-05 
(0.0005) 
0.0027*** 
(0.0010) 
MD9 
0.0005 
(0.0003) 
-0.0005 
(0.0013) 
0.0029*** 
(0.0010) 
 
0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0004) 
0.0007 
(0.0007) 
 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0001 
(0.0010) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0006) 
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MD10 
0.0005 
(0.0005) 
-0.0009 
(0.0010) 
0.0026*** 
(0.0009) 
 
0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
-0.0003 
(0.0005) 
0.0010** 
(0.0006) 
 
4.53E-05 
(0.0003) 
-0.0006 
(0.0007) 
0.0016*** 
(0.0006) 
MD11 
0.0005 
(0.0003) 
0.0001 
(0.0006) 
0.0031*** 
(0.0010) 
 
0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0004) 
0.0009* 
(0.0006) 
 
-3.50E-05 
(0.0003) 
-4.21E-06 
(0.0004) 
0.0022*** 
(0.0006) 
Constant 
0.0003 
(0.0005) 
0.0001 
(0.0010) 
-0.0034*** 
(0.0011) 
 
-6.20E-05 
(0.0003) 
-7.09E-05 
(0.0006) 
0.0005 
(0.0007) 
 
0.0003 
(0.0004) 
0.0002 
(0.0007) 
-0.0039*** 
(0.0008) 
Observations 7594 494 271  7594 494 271  7594 494 271 
R-squared 0.0228 0.0857 0.2089  0.0289 0.1342 0.2517  0.0102 0.0613 0.2467 
 
Note: The table reports regression results for sell block trades of December maturity EUA futures contracts executed on the European Climate Exchange (ECX) platform 
between January 2008 and April 2011. The coefficients are reported along with the standard errors (in parenthesis). The following regression is estimated using OLS with 
Newey and West (1987) heteroscedastic and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix: 
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All variables are as defined in Table 2. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
